Eagle Flights

An Eagle Flight operation was a tactical concept which involved the employment of a small, self-contained, and highly trained heliborne force. Tactical planning emphasised the use of this force to locate and engage the enemy or to pursue and attack an enemy which was fleeing from a larger friendly force. As an airmobile force it was also prepared to engage any enemy force which had been located and fixed by other friendly forces. The inherent flexibility of the Eagle Flight as a force that was ready for immediate commitment, either alone or in conjunction with other forces, was it's most significant feature.

An 'Eagle Flight' was a variation of the normal heliborne operations developed in Vietnam in order to:

• complement the operations of committed heliborne or ground forces
• extend the combat effectiveness of such forces
• operate independently, either alone or reinforced, on a variety of missions

As it's name implies, it was a force that was designed to search for, pursue and attack it's quarry.

Task Organisation and Planning

The basic Eagle Force consisted of four squads of soldiers, plus command elements - Company Commander, Executive Officer, four squad leaders and an optional Artillery Forward Observer - mounted in four troop carrying helicopters (see opposite). In the case of ARVN units, advisory elements such as a US Advisor and interpreter would also be present. As an aid to command and control, as well as for identification purposes in expediting loading and reloading, each person would wear a scarf or piece of cloth affixed to his uniform of an appropriate colour (red, green, blue and yellow).

Several of the following considerations resulted directly from local conditions and which were peculiar to operations in RVN where, in particular, language difficulties were encountered in supporting an ARVN Eagle Force with armed escort helicopters operated by US personnel. In circumstances where the entire Eagle Force was manned by US personnel, several of the following considerations would have been unnecessary.

• It was considered highly desirable that an additional flight of four troop carrying helicopters were available on standby commencing two hours after the initial operation started. These helicopters would be dispatched to the operational area to replace the original helicopters when refueling became necessary and thus would eliminate any delays in the conduct of the operations.
• When operating independently from other air-mobile or ground forces an Eagle Force would normally be supported by Tac Air.
• Helicopter availability often dictated alterations in the loading plans and in accommodating these changes the tactical integrity of the squads was always the primary concern. In operations involving ARVN with US support, any loading plan had to make provision for the need of maintaining the US Advisor in close proximity to his interpreter.
• An O-1 'Bird Dog' aircraft, capable of operating on the US radio net was essential for the purposes of spotting and marking, and to act as a radio relay as needed. In ARVN operations, a second O-1, operating on the ARVN radio net, was considered desirable.
• It was also highly desirable that the armed aircraft were be capable of communicating on the infantry FM net in order that air-ground operations could be coordinated effectively, especially in the case of ARVN operations where coordination between all ARVN forces and US units and personnel participating in the operation was the responsibility of the US Advisor on the ground. The US Advisor had a radio with him on the ground and would normally wear the crew chief's head set while airborne in the lead helicopter.

Missions

Reconnaissance in Force

An Eagle Force, supported by Tac Air and with light observation aircraft attached, could be assigned the mission of probing for the enemy in several 25-50 square kilometer areas, depending on the population densities in those areas. Sectors of search were assigned to the observation aircraft which, operating 'on-the-deck' would report on fleeing groups, armed persons, camouflaged individuals and positions, concentrations of sampans and the general reactions of people in the search areas. They would also recommend possible landing zones.

The eagle Force commander would be responsible for target selection while orbiting in the lead helicopter and would perform closer inspections of the potential objectives. He would also coordinate landing and/or assault plans with the armed escort helicopters and Tac Air. The armed escort helicopters would make assault passes prior to landings by the troop carrying helicopters. The eagle Force would then land and assault the enemy or else screen the area and interrogate civilians.

During the course of this operation, reports were continuously made to higher headquarters using the airborne observation aircraft for radio relay where necessary. The observation aircraft also scouted beyond the area in an attempt to detect enemy forces who had reacted to the Eagle Force landing, either by fleeing or preparing to attack.

If no enemy contact was made, or upon completion of the action, a pickup was then arranged. The troop carrying helicopters, under the cover of the armed escort, complete the pickup and the Eagle Force was then ready to continue it's search or else pursue any enemy reported by the observation aircraft.

Reinforce an Airmobile Force

An Eagle Force could be committed to reinforcing an airmobile force. By scheduling the arrival of the Eagle Force on-station to coincide with the arrival of the initial lift of a heliborne force at it's objective, the Eagle Force was in a position to immediately engage any enemy fleeing the AO.

Reinforce a Ground Force

An Eagle Force was quite capable of reinforcing a ground force by being placed on-station to operate in areas adjacent to the committed unit. In this situation, the armed escorts could perform low level search and target marking missions whilst coordination between the Eagle Force and the ground force could be accomplished as shown above.

Reinforce Itself

When heavy opposition was encountered by a committed Eagle Force, or if it was required to block an exit from the area of contact, the Eagle Force could reinforce itself quickly by using it's four empty troop carrying helicopters to bring additional squads into action. Within a few minutes after receiving a request for assistance relayed from the Eagle Force commander, four squads of soldiers from the nearest unengaged friendly unit could be made ready for pickup. Since the helicopters were in radio contact with the requesting eagle Force's commander, the reinforcements could be briefed on the situation, assigned objectives and given landing instructions whilst enroute.

Reinforce Air Strikes

An eagle Force could be landed immediately following the completion of an air strike in order to inflict additional casualties and damage or to engage surviving elemets of an enemy force.

Vertical Blocking Force

In areas of generally open terrain, an Eagle Force could assist ground troops whose movement had become slowed or halted by fire from snipers or small groups of enemy in covered or concealed positions. The threat posed by the hovering Eagle Force and the fires of the arescort helicopters were used to pin down the enemy while ground forces were maneuvered to destroy themmed .

Immediate Reaction Force

Of particular use and value was the ability of an Eagle Force to react immediately in support of isolated outposts or units. Upon request being made by such, either that intelligence suggested enemy activity in the area or that the outpost or unit was under attack, an Eagle Force could be dispatched to assault the enemy or reinforce the position.

Covering Force

An Eagle Force could be given a mission to provide cover for surface movement in the protection of boat and road traffic. Since this was considered to be a very costly mission in terms of forces and equipment it was only given in cases involving extremely high priority movements.

Operational Limitations

In some respects the Eagle Force concept had inherent weaknesses. Some of those remained for the duration of the War whilst others (notably communications) were gradually minimised or eliminated through technological improvements. One of the most notable difficulties was that of language arising from the participation in operations by personnel of different nationalities. To overcome those problems it was necessary to employ additional communications equipment and procedures which were adapted to the conditions. This limitation was not a consideration in the operations of a homogeneous force.

• The Eagle Force could not move by stealth since it's mode of transport advertised it's presence well in advance.
• The force was dependent upon considerable support and the more independent it's mission, the more support it required. As a consequence, coordination of the force and it's supporting elements was of paramount importance.

Some other limitations were as follows;

Reliance on Suitable Terrain

An Eagle Force could only be employed successfully in generally open terrain appropriate for helicopter operations. Extended areas without suitable LZ's, which would tend to 'swallow' a small force or which would render the armed escort useless, or which would limit LZ's to only a few that could be ambushed by the enemy prohibited their successful employment.

Vulnerability of Helicopters

Helicopters, and the Eagle Force itself, were particularly vulnerable to enemy ground fire during assault landings. In many cases, to be effective and to preclude an exhausting and possibly unsuccessful pursuit on foot, the eagle Force had to be landed amidst or immediately adjacent to the enemy.

Quite often the force would be separated by a terrain feature (e.g. canal or tree line). If, upon landing, these small forces were surprised by a large enemy force they could not be extricated easily since the helicopters were extremely vulnerable to loss if called in during a heavy engagement.

Limited Combat Power

An Eagle Force was, basically, a small platoon sized force and upon landing it's combat power was limited to the skill and fire power of the squads. The force itself usually carried no heavy weapons and only a limited number of machine guns (if any).

Factors in Planning a Landing

Experience was to show that several factors had to be considered in planning for a landing. The planning had to be accomplished almost immediately upon arrival over the selected target area since the enemy would already have commenced to react to the presence of the attacking force. Consequently, planning, decision making, and the communication of those decisions in the form of instructions to the force and it's supporting elements had to be almost simultaneous.

The following are some of the factors which had to be considered by the Eagle Force commander;

• In the case of suspected personnel, it was necessary to determine if they actually were enemy forces since there existed every possibility for mistaking Vietnamese friendly forces, armed and dressed in black or nondescript uniforms, for Viet Cong. Lack of communication and a positive means of identification often compounded this problem. However, it was also the case that invariably if the suspected personnel were enemy then this would be confirmed by their running, attempting to hide or firing at the helicopters.
• Care had to be taken in selecting the LZ especially when the target was located in close proximity to heavy vegetation so as to minimise the possibility of landing in a preplanned ambush based on hidden enemy forces.
• The commander was required to consider whether the enemy force was massed or scattered, organised to fight or disorganised and in flight. His decisions regarding the use of pre-assault airstrikes, choice of landing formation and the selection of a suitable LZ were all affected by the answers to these questions.
• If the logical target was bisected by a canal or similar terrain feature then the choice of landing formation, selection of LZ's and decisions regarding the capability of a split force against the enemy had to be considered.

Execution of the Assault

Once a commander had selected his target and decided upon his landing formation and plan of assault, he had to communicate his decisions to the helicopter pilots and the armed escort helicopter flight leader.

Generally a lack of time would not permit the prior briefing of each squad in helicopters 2, 3, and 4. Since the forces are not thoroughly briefed on either the landing formation or the assault plan, unless ground winds absolutely prohibited it the pilots would attempt to land in a direction which provided the troops a 3 o'clock exit from the aircraft toward the objective. Sometimes the crew chief of the helicopter would indicate to the soldiers the direction of the objective as it would appear to them as they emerged from the helicopter.

Immediately upon landing, squads were rapidly assembled and the commander and his squad leaders would quickly take control. Radio contact with the orbiting empty helicopters, the armed escort helicopters and the O-1 observation aircraft were immediately established and situation reports passed to higher headquarters.

Once on the objective, the troops would work rapidly to screen the area, kill or capture the enemy, apprehend suspects and then prepare to reload. Since an Eagle Force was considered to be more effective when airborne and in a position to attack, excessive time was not spent on the ground following the assault or capture of the enemy. If a more lucrative target was reported to the empty orbiting helicopters by other units then a red smoke grenade or some such pre-arranged signal would be dropped to indicate to the commander that the troops should be organised for extraction.

Reloading the Force

Upon completion of the ground action the commander would study the area and determine the disposition of his squads. he was responsible for insuring that the area was secure before the helicopters came in to land. If the terrain permitted it, the troops would be formed up in column of squads, approximately 30-meters between squads, with the last squad up-wind. However, if a squad was widely separated from the rest of the force, possibly seperated by a canal or other terrain feature, it could be reloaded in place, provided that a suitable LZ was available.

The commander would contact the helicopter flight leader and inform him of the wind direction and identify the LZ. It was Standard operating Procedure that should radio communications fail, then the formation of troops in line of squads was a visual cue that the area was secure and that the force was ready to reload. Each squad had a colour code (indicated by a scarf or piece of cloth worn on their uniforms) and each helicopter was designated by a corresponding colour code and thus identification for pickup and reloading was simplified.

Whilst awaiting the return of the helicopters and during all loading operations, each squad would maintain close security of the area whilst the armed escorts continued to orbit and protect both the troop helicopters and the troops themselves during the course of the reloading operation.

Reloading was done while the helicopters maintained partial power. If the helicopter was carrying nearly a full fuel load, or if prisoners aboard caused the load to exceed twelve men (all passenger seats are removed from the cargo compartment), it required an obstacle clear distance of about 900 meters in an up-wind direction for takeoff. each helicopter would take off as soon as loaded in order to minimise time on the ground, a period of great vulnerability.