Paramilitary Elements

As a whole, the paramilitary forces were referred to as the Popular Army or Dan Quan (literally, 'civilian troops'). However, since the paramilitaries waged an almost exclusively guerrilla war, the term Guerrilla or du kich (literally translated as 'strike and run' and applied both to the individual Guerilla and to Guerilla tactics in general) was added to the title, making it 'Guerilla Popular Army' or Dan Quan Du Kich. Western commentators referred to these paramilitary forces as Local Force Viet Cong.

The paramilitary units also served as a manpower pool from which the more talented could be drawn for assignment to the full military. Members of the Guerilla Popular Army were described in a Main Force indoctrination booklet as...

...young people with revolutionary spirit, with some fighting experience. They are responsible for keeping close contact with the enemy, at all times surrounding enemy forts and barracks, disrupting enemy communication and transportation, serving with and improving the self-defense groups. When enemy forces conduct raids they shall stick to them and harass them, protecting the security of the villes and identifying the enemy units that enter their ville. At the same time members of the Guerilla force will perform armed propaganda, liquidate tyrants in their area, and subvert in all ways the enemy's hold on the people.

Full Military Elements

The term "full military" is likely to mislead, for the NLF was not an ordinary army using orthodox military tactics. The full military, or Main Force, continued to rely on Guerilla tactics; its elements were self-contained and not part of some broader military establishment; members fought and thought like Guerillas, not like regular soldiers; the full military soldier was not in uniform; often his unit broke up between ops, and he lived with his family. Beyond these, differences between the NLF army and orthodox armies were in terms of infrastructure and logistics.

The army of any modern nation is tightly hierarchic, running from the squad (or individual soldier) to the High Command (or C-in-C) and tied together by a network of non-organic support services: communication, transportation, supply; vertical services such as ordnance, medical, quartermaster; and horizontal services such as artillery, armor, and engineers. The Guerilla unit, on the other hand, was conceived as a self-contained element. If a Guerilla unit leader needed ammunition, he did not requisition it; he planned an attack on an enemy supply base. If the unit was attacked, there was no radioing for air strikes or artillery support; the unit simply got out as best it could.

The resulting sense of isolation was what distinguished the mentality of a guerilla from that of a regular soldier; the psychology of the two was profoundly different. For the Guerilla there was no home front; the enemy, more numerous and powerful than he, was everywhere. The sense of being a hunted animal was never far below his level of consciousness.

Just as the paramilitary element of the NLF army was of two types, so the full military element was composed of two basic entities: the Regionals or Territorials (Bo Doi Dia Phuong), and the Main Force (Quan Doi Chu Luc), usually referred to as "hard hats" because of the distinguishing metal or fiberboard helmets, that they and their predecessors, the Viet Minh, wore. [Catagories of the NLF army are further obfuscated by the fact that the NLF, while considering its military forces to be of two basic types, in its public statements for propaganda purposes always addressed itself to three types, that is, "members of our Guerilla Popular Army, our Regional Troops, and our Main Forces."]

The Main Force was described in the Main Force indoctrination booklet mentioned earlier as being formed of young men with combat experience in the Guerilla Popular Army or Territorial forces who have been indoctrinated in ideas of the Revolution and class struggle, in organizational methods, and in combat techniques; who understand the problems of coordination; who have high leadership skills on the battlefield; and who have high fighting efficiency; most of all, of those who are able to further the political struggle movement.

Military activity, even Guerilla military activity, formed a relatively small percentage of the day-to-day work of the members of the NLF army, either of the paramilitary or of the Main Force units. Vietnamese officials estimated that a Main Force unit in the 1962-63 period spent an average of 1 day a month on military missions. Much of the rest of the time was devoted to training and indoctrination work, agit-prop and other propaganda activities among the general population, or in what was called 'eco-production' - mainly the production of food.

Most units had a dual responsibility for military action and food production, although certain units were excluded from the production work (thoat ly, literally, to be cut off, having no ties with). To be 'thoat ly' was to be elite. The Main Force for the most part was thoat ly, although some members ostentatiously made a point of working in the fields at harvest time. An area that was thoat ly was considered by ARVN troops to be highly dangerous since it meant that the enemy Guerillas were not tied down during part of the year by farming work and were free to conduct operations in keeping with the Liberation Army motto, which was "We support ourselves" (tu luc canh sinh, or, literally, to increase the provision for one's livelihood by one's own strength).

The Guerilla-unit spirit dictated self-support; if possible the unit depended on no outside help, and it paid its own way when necessary to purchase food or supplies. This too was a heritage from the Viet Minh. Defectors reported that their officers, in chastising them for wanting to depend on outside supplies, would quote General Giap's lectures to Viet Minh officers who waited for supplies from Communist China before planning an offensive.

The ARVN reported in early 1965 that the NLF army consisted of some 17 battalions, which it said were organized on paper into five regiments. The battalion was planned for 500 men but most had fewer, some as few as 250 men; the NLF Main Force company averaged about 85 men. There were an estimated 94 such companies as part of the 47 battalions. Of the total Main Force units in RVN, approx 1/3rd was in the ARVN's I and II Corps areas and 2/3rds in the III and IV Corps areas. [The ARVN divided RVN first into three and later into four military corps areas, numbering from north to south.]