Hanoi's Political-Military machine

The Communist regime in Hanoi directs, controls, and supplies the entire Viet Cong political and military effort to conquer the Republic of Vietnam. All control, political and military, comes ultimately from the Central Committee of North Vietnam's Lao Dong (Communist) Party, which maps out broad strategy. The Reunification Commission of the Northern government controls the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, and the Military High Command in the North is responsible for the military training of the men who infiltrate into the South. In addition, a central Intelligence organization in Hanoi - the Central Research Agency - maintains an elaborate intelligence network in South Vietnam and directs the extensive undercover activities of the Viet Cong.

The two Communist administrative headquarters in the South, inherited from the Viet Minh, have been merged into the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). This central "brain" coordinates all Communist activity in the South and all relations with the highest Communist Party and government echelons in North Vietnam.

In South Vietnam itself, the Communists have created a show of legitimacy through the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. At the national headquarters level, the Front has a central committee and presidium, which take their orders from the control committee of the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) - the Communist Party in South Vietnam.

The Front's national central committee sets policy and also is responsible for planning and organization building. The next level in the Communist-dominated Front hierarchy consists of the 3 interzone headquarters, which determine agitprop (persuasion and propaganda), policy-guidance, and which are responsible for political indoctrination and training. Under the interzone headquarters are 7 zone headquarters, which are their sub-offices. Next in the Front's structure are the approximately 30 provincial committees - its chief operating units.

These committees direct the "liberation associations" the Communists use to spread their indoctrination and propaganda and to gain the often unwitting support of the South Vietnamese people. The committees, of course, also transmit to subordinate levels the orders sent down from the central committee. In addition, and this is a major role for the provincial-level Communists, they assign military duties to the Viet Cong units operating in their provinces.

The Front's committees and cells in South Vietnam's districts, towns, and villages make up the largest part of the Communist spiderweb spread like an evil shadow over the land. In the "liberated," or Viet Cong dominated areas of South Vietnam, they are in the open, free of Government interference as they carry out their so-called political struggle, recruit and train men for their local Viet Cong units, and carry out the military or guerrilla tasks they are assigned.

In the areas controlled by the legitimate Government, of course, the Communists and grass-level front members must remain under cover and work in secret in their efforts to overthrow the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

Since the Communists are using the National Liberation Front to camouflage their anti-Government activities, their People's Revolutionary (Communist) Party organization parallels the Front structure, and that Communist apparatus keeps a tight control on the Front from the top-level central committee to at least the provincial level.

The military arm is completely integrated into the Front structure from the very top to the lowest level, with military representatives found at all organizational levels of the Front. Since the Vietnamese Communists consider the war in South Vietnam to be primarily a political struggle, the primary duty of the Viet Cong military forces is to support that political aggression being conducted by the Communists in the name of the National Movement to Liberate South Vietnam.

A 64-page Front indoctrination booklet on the organization of its armed forces declared that organization must conform to political lines; that the Liberation Army (Viet Cong) is a fighting army and therefore must be highly centralized with inferiors obeying superiors, there must be discipline; and that the army's political tasks are fundamental, maintaining unity between cadres and men, and between the army and the people.

The booklet pointed out that these three principles insure that military action is subordinated to political action, that the army is united, and that the people are closely united with the army.

To insure continuous political orientation of the army and maintain political control over the army's officer corps, political officers, or commissars, are assigned to all Viet Cong units. They are the political watchdogs and indoctrinators of the Front's Liberation Army.

The Viet Cong, the so-called Liberation Army, in South Vietnam is about one half of the total Communist armed forces in all Vietnam. The other half comprises North Vietnam's People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). The Viet Cong forces consist of two basic elements, the paramilitary, and the full military. The paramilitary Viet Cong is generally a local civilian who is a part-time soldier or guerrilla, whose military duties do not take him far from his community. In addition, he is not highly indoctrinated politically.

The Front's name for its paramilitary force was originally the Popular Army. However, since this force is engaged almost exclusively in guerrilla warfare, the name has been expanded to Guerrilla Popular Army (GPA). At the hamlet level, the GPA unit is either a cell, a half squad, or a squad - 3, 6, 12 men. The GPA unit at the village level (a village consists of several hamlets), is made up of 3 or 4 squads - 36 to 48 men.

There area two basic classes of GPA members. The first is the village guerrilla, frequently an older man, who is generally used as a village defender. He has little training and is armed with scanty or primitive weapons. The second is the combat guerrilla, who is younger and better trained and armed. He is frequently called upon to aid guerrilla mobile columns or full military units in their operations in the vicinity of the his village or hamlet. The combat guerrilla units also serve as manpower pools for the Viet Cong's full military units.

The Viet Cong's full military element also is divided into two types-the Regional Forces and the Main Force. They are not set up or operated like orthodox army units. Their units are self-contained, not uniformed, and rely primarily on guerrilla tactics. Since they are dependent for much of their logistical support on local populations, their commanders can't simply forward supply requisitions to a depot. Instead, when they need weapons, ammunition, or other military hardware they attack a Government base or unit and try to capture what they want.

The Regional Forces, also called Territorials or Regionals, are units established by Front district committees, which provide their leadership and direct their activities. A Regional Force operates pretty much in one general area.

The elite units of the so-called Liberation Army are the battalions of the Main Force. They have acquired the name of "Hard Hats" because of the metal or fiberboard helmets that distinguish them from the Regional Forces and the paramilitary guerrillas. These battalions are directed by the Front committees at the provincial level and range farther afield in their military operations than do the units of the Regional Forces. As members of the Main Force, the "Hard Hat" Viet Cong don't have to perform non-military work, such as producing food or transporting supplies. By the end of 1965 there were over 65,000 of these Hard Hats fighting in South Vietnam.

This organization seems cumbersome and the chain of command indirect and slow, in contrast to orthodox military practice of establishing a direct military chain of command from top to bottom. However, the Viet Cong's political and military structure conforms to the classic Communist pattern of strong central authority at the top and operations at lower level decentralized, with Communist Party control over the government at all levels, and political control over the military at all levels.

The Cadre - How He Operates

Although few, except those immediately affected, realized the war was on in the late 1950's and early 1960's, those who were the victims of the savage campaigns of terrorism, assassination, and kidnapping in rural Vietnam were well aware of it. So too were the thousands of cadres - trained, dedicated, hard-core Communist leaders and military officers - who fanned out in the countryside to win support for the insurgent forces. A cadre's role can be described as a combination priest, policeman, and propagandist. He is the Party and the Front in the countryside hamlets and villages. How they operate is graphically described by one of them, Captain Lam;

We seek to do three things. The first is to drive a wedge between the people and their government, to make the people hate their government, and the Americans. Our second objective is to get people to join our (VC) armed forces. The third is to persuade them to increase their production of food, and give the increase to us.

Our cadre go into each village to study the situation and the people. Once they know the people and their problems, our cadre can explain how these problems are the fault of the government, and how the people can achieve their ambitions by following us. In this way we make the people hate their government, and can destroy the government in their village. Then we guide them in forming their own government (under our control) and in organizing their own armed forces, which of course are our auxiliaries.

Of course we cannot do this right away in those villages and districts where the government is strong. There we concentrate on educating people politically to hate their government, and on forming both open and secret organizations which can support us, or embarrass the government. Every little bit helps. Any voluntary action of the people, from organized protests to simply slowing down on work ordered by the government, is a clear gain for us.

Our cadre live in the village, or, if this is not safe, very close by. They appeal to the ideals, the patriotism, and the emotions of each individual according to his situation, and try to recruit him for the cause. If a person is arrested by government forces we try to contact him as soon as he is released, sympathize with him, arouse his hatred of the government, and recruit him. Many times we bring hungry, tired troops into a village so that the people may see how we are suffering for them, and arouse their sympathy. We try in every possible way to create hatred for the government and the Americans, to separate the people from the government and to make them see that we are their only hope.

Today, with the increase in Viet Cong forces, more emphasis is placed on terror and murder ("destroying the village government") and less on persuasion. Organizing and involving everyone possible in a maximum effort, coupled with incessant propaganda, is still emphasized as essential to Viet Cong success.

Next Page: The Diversity of the Viet Cong