The Role of the Forward Artillery Officer in an Air-Assault

The 16 helicopters are flying at 90 knots at tree-top level, the pilots taking advantage of the cover afforded by the contour of the earth. Inside the lead helicopter, the company commander and the artillery forward observer have received by radio the final location of the landing zone and objective. At an earlier briefing, they had been given several projected landing zones and objectives, for which they had planned supporting fires. Based on the latest information concerning the enemy situation, the final objective is assigned to the company commander en route to the area of operations.

The company commander then briefs the forward observer on the landing zones (LZs), the objective, the route to the objective and the proposed positions the three platoons will occupy. Together, they make a quick check of the fire plan to insure that the pre-planned concentrations will effectively support the new scheme of maneuver.

As the helicopters clear the top of a hill, the FO gets a brief glimpse of smoke rising in the vicinity of the objective. This is the final phase of the preparation that is being fired in support of the assault; the smoke shells were fired to mask the approach of the lift helicopters.

The preparation was initiated with an air-strike on the objective by Air Force fighter bombers. Between aircraft passes, the artillery battalion fired two volleys to pin down the enemy. The howitzer fires were adjusted by a heliborne observer, through coordination with the liaison officer (LO). Both the tactical fighters and air observer spotted enemy locations during the the preparation and transmitted the information to the LO. The reconnaissance sergeant, with the assault lift, monitored the transmissions and passed the information to the FO and company commander.

At this point the flight is less than one minute out.

As the lift helicopters touch down and unload their troops, the UH-1B aerial rocket artillery (ARA) ships provide suppressive fires for the infantry troops while they clear the landing zone and advance toward the objective. The FO, moving with the infantry, initially will have limited observation of enemy activity. The aircraft under the direction of the FO act as his "eyes" - spotting targets along the approach routes and in and around the objective area.

The point platoon has been pinned down by fire from a machinegun nest. The FO requests a fire mission from the aircraft, giving the coordinates, the nature of the target and a vector, in degrees, to the target. The vector is the direction the pilot flies to insure that he is always firing over friendly positions toward the target. If the pilot cannot identify the target, the FO can adjust the rounds fired on each pass using normal procedure (e.g. RIGHT 20, ADD 200... ). The FO continues to adjust until the target is destroyed or the pilot identifies the target. The mission is ended and surveillance is given by whoever is in the better position to see the effects of the fire.

If the target is large enough or of such a nature that a greater amount of firepower is required, the FO or LO can request that tactical air support be provided. Instead of conducting the mission directly with the aircraft, the FO contacts the forward air controller (FAC), the Air Force representative, who directs the aircraft. The procedure, however, is the same - coordinates, nature of target and vector - and the rounds are adjusted in the same way. Any additional directions that will speed up the mission or improve the effectiveness of the fire can be incorporated into the procedure.

The advantages of both ARA and TAC air are rapid reaction time, speed of adjustment and ability to attack moving targets and targets that the FO cannot observe. When not firing missions, the aircraft can be utilised for reconnaissance. The disadvantages are fuel limitations, weather, ammunition load and vulnerability to enemy ground fire. If the target requires a heavy and continuous pounding, the FO will utilise the tube artillery elements at his disposal.

Close coordination is necessary between the aircraft, FO, LO and fire direction centre (FDC) to insure that aircraft do not fly through friendly artillery fires.

Although no-fire lines, flight routes and schedules are established, the final responsibility lies with the FO and the LO. In some cases, the FO serves as the FAC.

One of the FO's responsibilities is to maintain the best possible communications at all times. The FO party has two AN/PRC-25 radios, which allow the FO to communicate over substantial distances and with multiple agencies - infantry, armor, aircraft and artillery. Because of the weight and space limitations dictated by air assault aircraft, the members of the FO party must learn to operate with minimum gear. Besides the two radios (and extra batteries), the party carries binoculars, compasses, enough maps to cover extensive areas of operation, rations, rifles, a basic load of ammunition and smoke grenades to mark friendly positions. With this load it is imperative that the artilleryman remain in the best possible physical condition.

Air assault units often find themselves with a large area to cover. This necessitates a relatively wide dispersion of elements. On the company level, this makes the FO's job of maintaining fire support difficult. One method that can be used is the assignment of a light observation helicopter to an FO who finds himself with poor visibility and widely dispersed elements to support. He can become airborne quickly and maintain surveillance on a periodic or an on-call basis.

With the helicopter there are few positions, no matter how inaccessible to ground travel, that the FO cannot reach. Once an area of observation has been established, the heliborne FO party lands nearby and proceeds on foot to establish an OP. If the terrain conditions are such that a landing is impossible, the FO party can rappel from the aircraft at tree-top level.

This has been a brief description of some of the activities and requirements of an FO during the initial assault phase of an airmobile operation. Intensive prior planning, with special attention to flexibility, is required in air assault operations.

The FO must constantly be ready to cast out at a moments notice the plans he spent all night in receiving, preparing and assimilating, at best adapting them to new situations. In the example discussed in this article, the company commander started the mission before the specific objective had been established. He and the FO were given, at an earlier briefing, several projected LZ's and objectives for which they planned supporting fires. Based on the latest information on the enemy situation, the infantry battalion commander selected the objective. The final objective was assigned to the company commander en route to the area of operations. This last minute change caused the FO to finalize his plans on the aircraft, adding new concentrations to his fire plan based on the latest enemy locations.

Air assault moves fast, and the artillery FO must provide for fire support to be available more rapidly than ever before.