Command and Control (C&C) Helicopters

THE ARRIVAL OF two U.S. Army helicopter companies in Vietnam in December 1961 to transport units of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam initiated the build-up of an unprecedented airmobile capability. The final number of helicopters used in Vietnam would have startled even the most ardent proponents of Army aviation 10 years previously.

In the past, the use of helicopters could be justified only when the mission could not be accomplished in any other way or when it was of the highest priority. In Vietnam, these versatile aircraft were used routinely for every function of combat. Army helicopters provided a degree of mobility that enabled the ground commander to overcome the obstacles of the terrain which would normally favour the insurgent enemy. Almost every operation involved heliborne troops lifted into the battle area to initiate ground combat. These troops were reinforced, re-supplied, and their casualties evacuated by helicopters. As a battle progressed, units could be recycled by air into more advantageous positions to facilitate their mission of destroying the enemy.

Airmobile operations become a way of life in Vietnam and the scale and complexity of these operations required commanders to take to the air to effectively exercise their command and control responsibilities over widespread units in the jungle. Battalion and brigade commanders spent many hours daily in helicopters controlling airmobile operations and the tactical employment of their combat forces on the ground. To properly exercise this control, these commanders needed to have available to them a helicopter capable of carrying a four or five-man command group and equipped with adequate communications to enter all of the necessary radio nets. This requirement for a heliborne command post was fulfilled best by the UH-1 'Huey' helicopter with a command radio console installed.

The equipment, techniques, and procedures employed in heliborne command posts were constantly being updated and refined as a result of experience gained in Vietnam. Information of this type was of particular interest to personnel anticipating assignments to tactical units in that theatre. This article highlights the evolution of the heliborne command post and the procedures and techniques associated with this means of control which were successfully employed in Vietnam.

Development of the Helicopter Command Post

The heliborne command post (HCP) was a fairly recent innovation. During the Korean War, the H-13 (later the OH-13 'Sioux') helicopter was used for command visits but the requirement did not exist for the exercise of command and control of ground combat operations from the air. This was rather fortunate perhaps because the U.S. helicopter inventory at that time was very limited. The H-19 (later the UH-19 'Chickasaw') helicopter had the prerequisite lift capability for an HCP, but the ground observation from the passenger compartment was quite inadequate, if not impossible at times.

The French use of large-scale airmobile operations during the Algerian revolution generated the requirement for a flying command post. French helicopter units were sent to Algeria in 1956 to provide an improved reaction capability against the rebel forces. In their early airmobile operations, it became obvious that an airborne command and control group was necessary to properly control the various elements of the airmobile task forces. The French field manual on air operations in Algeria described this concept as follows:

The Flying Command Post is formed by the two ground and air commanders in an aircraft equipped with communications capable of providing links with the higher echelons of command, the troops on the ground, the airfields, and the flying aircraft.

Although the French used both fixed and rotary wing aircraft for these flying command posts, helicopters were preferred because they provided better ground visibility and enabled the ground commander to land when necessary to personally influence the ground action.

By 1960, the growing emphasis on airmobility in the U.S. Army germinated a frustration on the part of the airmobile task force commander - the commander of the ground forces involved in the operation. If he did not fly in the slow-moving H-13, he was relegated to sit in the "box" of the H-19 or the H-34 (later the CH-34 'Choctaw') helicopter during the air movement portion of the operation and hope that everything was going well. Rudimentary efforts were made to tie him into the aircraft communications system, or his radio operator would stick the flexible antenna of a ground radio out the door of the helicopter. Neither solution worked well. At that time the U.S. Army did not have an adequate aerial vehicle to permit the commander to exercise his command and control functions while airborne.

Introduction of the UH-1 Huey

A suitable vehicle to serve as a platform for the HCP was found in the UH-1 helicopter. In 1960, eight of the first UH-1As were assigned to the 101st Airborne Division for troop testing. The potential of this aircraft as a command post was readily apparent because it provided excellent visibility of the ground from the passenger compartment. At Fort Campbell, Ky., the UH-1 was used in the command post role with ground radios carried in the passenger compartment. Later, "jerry-built" radio packages were fabricated in an attempt to improve the command communications capability.

As more UH-1 helicopters entered the inventory and were assigned to other tactical units, additional commanders began to use the UH-1 as an HCP. While these commanders could observe the ground action from the UH-1, they did not have sufficient radios to enter all of the required nets and often were frustrated with the intermittent reliability of their available communications.

In 1963, the ever-increasing number of airmobile operations being conducted in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) created a definite requirement for the use of an HCP. These operations were conducted by units of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), accompanied by their American advisors and supported by U.S. Army helicopter units. The typical command group in the HCP consisted of the ARVN commander, his senior U.S. advisor, the air liaison officer and an artillery advisor. The U. S. Army aviation element commander or his operations officer was considered a member of the command group and normally occupied the pilot or co-pilot's seat of the helicopter command post.

To exercise effective command and control of these fast-moving operations, it was essential for the command group to have the ability to enter several radio nets simultaneously. The ARVN commander required a frequency modulated (FM) radio to control his ground units. The senior U.S. advisor needed a second FM set to communicate with the American advisors who were with the ARVN units. An ultra high frequency (UHF) radio was necessary for the air liaison officer to maintain contact with the forward air controller directing the combat support aircraft strikes. In addition, a high frequency single side band (HF SSB) radio was required to enter the corps air support operations net. The aviation lift commander could use the helicopter's organic FM and UHF radios to exercise control of his aircraft.

Communication Consoles

To meet this requirement, several versions of consoles containing the necessary radios were constructed and installed in HCPs and their effectiveness in the combat environment evaluated. These early versions of the console provided adequate communications for the command group, but their size and weight were unacceptable. They partially blocked the observation of individuals sitting in the rear center seats and prohibited any lateral movement within the passenger compartment. The added weight was a crucial factor in maximum gross weight and center of gravity considerations for the helicopter. Follow-on consoles were designed and fabricated to eliminate these deficiencies. In 1965 a basic console was approved that included two FM radios, one VHF radio, one UHF radio, and one high-frequency, single side band radio. Designated the AN/ASC-6, this console was designed for quick installation and removal.

In 1968 the AN/ASC-10 console was developed (see Figure 1). This item was smaller and easier to install and provided an intercom system for the command group on board the aircraft. Both aircraft-type and ground-type radios were used in various versions of these radio consoles leading to the development of another new console, the AN/ASC-11 (see Figure 2), that consisted of two vehicular FM radios plus the organic, high-frequency, single side band in the aircraft. Two AN/ASC-11's could be installed in one aircraft. Combat Developments Command recommended that this console, with ground-type radios, be issued for use in HCPs used by ground tactical units. This type of console was selected because it contained VRC-type FM radios which ground tactical units used and had the capability to maintain. It could be removed easily from a helicopter that was down for maintenance and readily installed in any replacement UH-1 helicopter. The later consoles such as the AN/ASC-15 (see Figure 3) included controls which provided the capability for secure voice operation of the FM radios. Techniques of employing the HCP differed considerably between units.

The composition of the command group and the equipment configuration of the helicopter varied according to the type of operations being conducted and the resources available. The typical employment of HCPs can best be illustrated by describing their use during an assault operation by an infantry battalion in the airmobile division. This unit was structured and equipped specifically to exploit the airmobility concept. Each brigade was authorized five UH-1 helicopters for use by the brigade and battalion commanders as HCPs.

Use of the HCP during an Air Assault

In the operation to be described, an infantry battalion, supported by one of the two assault helicopter battalions organic to the division, has the mission of making an initial heliborne assault into an enemy-controlled area. Prior reconnaissance has been performed and a detailed plan prepared to support the operation. The operation order specifies that preparatory fires will be used to support the landing. Tactical air, tube artillery, and helicopters from the division's organic aerial rocket artillery battalion will fire in accordance with a prearranged time schedule.

The infantry battalion command group in the HCP for this type of operation consisted of the commander, the S3, the artillery liaison officer and the air liaison officer. The battalion sergeant major and one or two ground radio operators with PRC-25 radios accompanied the command group if space was available.

In the airmobile division, unlike other units, the ground commander and the helicopter battalion commander normally did not ride in the same helicopter. The helicopter battalion commander had his own HCP which was equipped with one communications central for the use of his command group. This arrangement permitted greater flexibility for both commanders by not limiting their individual freedom of movement during an operation.

After the first lift was on the ground, the infantry battalion commander may have desired to land in the objective area while the helicopter battalion commander deemed it necessary to supervise the refueling activities or the loading of the next lift. Once the battalion lift was completed, the requirement for separate HCPs became mandatory. The infantry commander needed his HCP to control the ensuing ground combat operations while the helicopter battalion HCP was used to co-ordinate the lift of other infantry battalions into different objective areas.

To insure that the preparatory fires were properly located and adequate, the infantry battalion HCP left the pickup zone (PZ) in sufficient time to arrive in the vicinity of the landing zone (LZ) to observe the initial air strikes. The forward air controller (FAC) in a separate aircraft would be directing the strikes. The air liaison officer in the HCP maintained contact with the FAC on one of the four available FM frequencies in the communications central. The artillery liaison officer was tied in with the fire direction center on a second FM frequency. The other two frequencies were set on the brigade and infantry battalion command nets and were used primarily by the battalion commander and the S3. Each member of the command group could monitor all four frequencies but by prior arrangement had primary responsibility for a specific channel. Necessary coordination within the HCP was accomplished over the intercommunications system.

The artillery liaison officer directed the tube artillery to commence firing when the FAC indicated that his aircraft were completing their last firing run. He observed the initial volley and then adjusted as necessary to place the fire as desired by the infantry battalion commander.

In the meantime, the troop helicopters would have lifted off from the PZ and be enroute. The helicopter battalion HCP accompanied the lift to provide navigational assistance, to supervise suppressive fires along the flight route by the battalion's organic aerial weapons helicopters, and to report any deviation from the air movement plan to the infantry battalion HCP.

The command group in the helicopter battalion CP included the commander, the S3, the S2 or the flight operations officer and the the sergeant major. The battalion commander, occupying one of the pilot's s seats, used the aircraft UHF radio to control his formation. He had the aircraft FM radio on the infantry battalion command net to maintain continuous contact with the infantry battalion commander. The S3 had one set on the helicopter battalion command net. The other FM set was used to monitor the appropriate nets involved in directing the preparatory fires from the infantry HCP. This arrangement provided the helicopter battalion with the latest information regarding the situation in the objective area.

The helicopter battalion commander reported that the formation was approaching the release point (RP), which was three minutes out from the LZ. In the infantry HCP, the artillery liaison officer gave instructions for the tube artillery to fire the last volley, which had been prearranged to include one round of white phosphorus to indicate visually that the preparation was complete. He then alerted the aerial rocket artillery (ARA) platoon which had been orbiting in the vicinity of the RP. The ARA platoon leader received an "On the way" from the artillery liaison officer and positioned his helicopters about one minute in front of the troop ships as the formation approached the LZ. The ARA platoon leader observed the burst of the white phosphorus round and began his firing run.

The helicopter battalion commander then ordered his armed helicopters to begin their suppressive fires when the ARA portion of the preparation was completed. As the troop helicopters approached the LZ, the doorgunners opened fire with their machineguns providing additional covering fire until just prior to touchdown. A subsequent report from the ground that the LZ was secure would be welcome news to the HCP. A transmission on the intercom was not necessary for the infantry battalion commander to indicate to his staff that he was pleased with the coordination of the operation - a silent nod and a smile expressed his feelings.

The success of the operation can be attributed to the control which the infantry battalion commander had over all of the elements in the airmobile task force. This degree of control was possible only because he and his staff were in an HCP. If at any time during the operation a modification or a radical change in plans had been required, the necessary details could have been coordinated with all of the elements involved in a matter of seconds.

Maintaining the Helicopter Command Post

BG Sidney B. Berry, Jr., in his Observations of a Brigade Commander, stated that "The brigade commander cannot afford to be without instant access to his helicopter [HCP] ." This conviction was typical of Vietnam-experienced brigade and battalion commanders and emphasised the importance of the continuous availability of this type of control facility. During the crucial phase of an operation, even the routine refueling of the HCP became a critical factor. For this reason, forward refueling facilities were established for the HCP and the refueling of the helicopter was planned so that there would not be any interruption in the control of the operation. The commander had to constantly be aware of the time remaining before the aircraft had to be refueled.

In the event that a replacement helicopter was not available, scheduled maintenance also had to be performed so as not to conflict with the commander's anticipated use of the HCP. Usually the crew- chief could accomplish all of the scheduled maintenance, except the "periodic inspection," without curtailing the use of the helicopter. This periodic inspection was required every 100 flying hours and took on the average one or two days to complete.

The size of the command group and the equipment carried in the HCP were limited by the gross weight capability of the helicopter. Personnel not essential to the control of the operation were left on the ground. The extra equipment on the helicopter was inspected periodically to eliminate all the unnecessary items carried. Many commanders required that the normal operating weight of the HCP be kept sufficiently below the maximum gross weight so that, in an emergency, a medical evacuation could be performed or a subordinate commander taken on a joint reconnaissance.

The crew of the HCP made significant contributions to the effectiveness of the operation. When the HCP was on the ground, the aircraft commander would frequently visit the operations tent to keep himself posted on the activities taking place. In this manner, the crew were able to anticipate when the HCP would be used and also be knowledgeable of the details of the operation. In quick-reaction type situations, this expedited the takeoff and the arrival over the crucial point. When the crew knew what the requirements were, the aircraft could be flown in such a manner as to facilitate the observation of the command group.

Summary

The HCP was a most effective facility when properly employed. Relatively few were found outside of RVN at this time and for this reason, the great majority of commanders and staff officers did not have the opportunity to use one until they served in a tactical unit in Vietnam. There was a requirement for a comprehensive publication on the HCP which encompassed lessons learned so that these personnel could benefit from the experience of others.

Commanders in Vietnam were adamant in stating their requirements for additional HCPs. Except in the airmobile division, an insufficient number of helicopters and radio consoles were authorized for this purpose. The type of operations conducted in Vietnam dictated that HCPs down to maneuver battalion level be made available. These were required not only during the airmobile phase of an operation, but also to control and coordinate ground operations more effectively. An adequate number of UH-1 helicopters and radio consoles needed to be placed in the organizational structure of Army divisions and brigades to satisfy this requirement.

The war in Vietnam introduced a new dimension in the realm of command and control. The HCP provided the commander with the combined capabilities of an excellent observation post, reliable communications and rapid transportation to any of his units on the battlefield. When their units were engaged with the enemy, commanders relied heavily on the HCP to enable them to observe the action, make better decisions, and personally influence the tide of battle by their timely presence at the crucial place.