Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA)

In the aerial rocket artillery (ARA) battalion, the objective was to deliver timely aerial artillery fires throughout the area of operations and to respond rapidly to any tactical mission that might be assigned. In furtherance of these objectives, SOPs were developed that proved to be successful in application. They were modified as necessary to cope with new problems. The following paragraphs discuss some of the problems encountered and aerial artillery operations in general.

Fire Mission Response

To provide rapid response, each battery designated an alert platoon, with the crews waiting in or near the aircraft which had been untied and pre-flighted. The platoon or section leader monitored his radio or telephone at the aircraft for fire missions. When an aerial artillery battery received a fire mission, the "alert" platoon or section was normally airborne within 2 minutes and en route toward the target.

2/20th ARA at BONG SON

Upon receipt of a "Fire Mission," the aircraft were started and run up, and checks were made while the platoon or section leader copied the mission. The format differed slightly from the standard artillery fire mission in that only the essentials of target location, direction of movement (if a moving target), and a brief target description were given initially. An early innovation was added by the battery operations providing a heading and time to target computed while plotting the target. This allowed the aircraft to proceed immediately toward the target without wasting valuable seconds finding the proper maps, plotting the location, and determining the correct heading prior to take-off. The platoon or section leader, plotted the target, planned the attack, and gave his fire commands, while en route

To reduce response time, the following factors were considered:

• Location of fire units. Response time was reduced by positioning ARA as close to the target area as the situation permitted.
• Pre-positioning of fuel and ammunition. This also reduced response time by allowing aircraft to be refuelled and rearmed at positions as close to objective areas as security permitted.
• Direct lines of communication between supported and supporting units. Considerable time was consumed when fire mission requests were relayed through various headquarters prior to reaching the unit to deliver the fires. Therefore, whenever practicable, the missions of reinforcing or general support-reinforcing were assigned to provide a quick fire channel for the supported unit.

En Route Procedures

To avoid detection en route and reduce exposure time to ground fire and air defense units, aircraft were flown "nap of the earth" with altitudes of 50 feet being regarded as 'high'. Through proper training and an alert attitude the threat of striking unseen obstacles was reduced to a minimum.

Flying at this low level greatly increased the problem of navigation, particularly when over great expanses of wooded area. DECCA, an electro-mechanical system graphically displaying the aircraft's position, proved to be of little value on short range flights because of the time delay in orientating and checking for accuracy. DECCA was used as a means to navigate to the objective area.

The ability to navigate to and sometimes below tree-top level was a must for air assault operations and increased as a direct function of training and practice. Accurate map reading combined with the use of a pre-selected course to the target area for a computed time (dead reckoning) proved to be the method most practical, accurate, and successful, for en route navigation.

The flight, regardless of the number of aircraft involved, was normally in an echelon formation en route so as to avoid more than one aircraft passing over the same point. It became the flight leader's responsibility to insure that all aircraft in his flight were advised of en-route obstacles.

Attack Techniques

With a platoon or section attacking a target from a single direction, one of two formations were used depending on the target's disposition. The first, employed primarily against a linear type target, was a formation of aircraft in column or "trail" with about 800 meters between aircraft. With all aircraft attacking parallel to the long axis of the target, a separation was necessary to allow each aircraft to fire and break off before the succeeding aircraft initiated firing. In the early days of ARA, no precise range or deflection probable errors had been established for the M3 rocket system because of uncontrollable variables such as air currents and gust effects. However, the range spread was known to be greater than the deflection; thus, the trail formation was more effective against a linear target than the second attack formation of line or "spread." In the spread formation, all aircraft came up on a line running perpendicular to the direction of attack. Normally used against area type targets, this formation had the advantage of permitting all aircraft to fire simultaneously and to maximize the volume of fire and surprise. Each aircraft, depending on its position in the formation, was assigned a corresponding portion of the target, much like individual howitzers firing a deflection spread. A disadvantage of the formation was the loss in aircraft maneuverability in the event of any weapon system being forced to break off the attack. The inside aircraft had to insure that the outside aircraft had turned away from the target before he too could turn.

ARA airborne and enroute

Altitudes used in attacking the target with either formation were approximately the some. Tree-top level was maintained once the attack was commenced until reaching a point 2,000-2,500 meters away from the target. A pull-up to approximately 300 feet was then initiated so that the rockets could be fired at a negative angle to decrease range dispersion. This momentary increase in altitude was maintained only so long as it was necessary to fire the desired number of rockets. Short ranges between 1,200-1,800 meters were normal. After firing, an immediate transition back to "nap of the earth" flying was started with the turn away from the target, taking advantage of whatever terrain was available for masking return fire. If more than one attack was required, another attack direction was usually selected to confuse the now alerted enemy.

The primary element of a fire mission using these techniques was accurate target location (six place coordinates). Since, when using direct fire techniques, the aircraft were subjected to greater exposure over enemy terrain, minimum time spent searching for the target was desirable. Often, friendly forward observers gave vectoring information to attacking aircraft with much success. A fault that was to be avoided in this technique was the tendency of an inexperienced controller to maneuver the aircraft too close to the target.

Often aerial rocket artillery was called upon to neutralize anti-aircraft, aggressor and defense sites (.50-cal MGs, mortars etc.) which were obvious threats to any operation which depended on the third dimension for movement. Normally out of range of the division ground artillery, these sites were major threats to the execution of air assault operations deep in the enemy's rear. To eliminate this danger to the troop-carrying helicopters, the aerial artillery was frequently given the mission of neutralizing this threat. More planning time was given to this type of mission than to others to insure that the most effective techniques were used. A thorough map reconnaissance was made to select a flight route and attack direction most limiting for the particular sites acquisition and firing capabilities. Whenever possible, the target was attacked in two or more directions to decrease the chance that aircraft would be picked up and to increase the element of surprise. At a pre-designated time, fire was massed on the target. Surveillance of damage was usually limited to estimates only, since lingering in the target area invited counter-fire.

The objective - to place fire on the enemy.

Elements of the aerial rocket battalion were frequently called upon to provide artillery support for air assault operations. Depending on the needs of the task force commander, either preparatory or on-call fires, or both, were provided. Aerial artillery accompanied the lift formation en route to the landing zone or met it at an orbit point in the vicinity the objective. The drag created by the rocket pods made it difficult for the aerial artillery to move out from a troop formation to fire a preparation before the assault began. Unless required for column escort, it was more acceptable for aerial artillery to select its own flight route to a designated orbit point and to choose a firing direction most advantageous to the fire unit for the preparation. Timing became all important in this technique since the orbit point departure time plus en route time to the firing point equalled the time on target, backward planning was required from the desired time of the preparation. It became standard that the expenditure of ammunition for the preparation was one-half load, with the remainder kept for on-call missions from the fire support coordinator.

Night fire missions were performed regularly and with much success. In actuality, the greatest problem encountered during night firing was the danger of losing night vision from the lighted sight reticle and the bright burning of the rockets. Techniques and field expedients to reduce the brightness of the sight reticle were used to overcome this disadvantage. Night missions were handled in much the same way as day-light missions with minor variations in the interest of safety, to allow a greater margin for error in the spread of formations and the proximity to terrain. Again, the time-distance technique coupled with visible check points were the primary means of night navigation. Once in the target area, evidence of enemy activity was sought before a firing run was started to assure effective fire. If harassing fires were planned, rockets were fired into the target area without taking the time to determine the target's precise location.

Displacements

The "Lean-and-mean" concept for the aerial artillery was emphasized when the unit was required to move forward and operate for an extended period of time without benefit of any ground vehicle support. The only vehicles allowed forward were the aircraft with whatever equipment could be carried internally.

On one occasion, an ARA battalion was forced to make a night displacement because of a change in the tactical situation. Movement to a previously reconnoitred position was handled smoothly in accordance with the unit's SOP. An advance party was dispatched with radios and a portable lighting set to prepare the landing area. Aircraft were dispatched by platoon to occupy the position as soon as the area was deemed secure. Only dim aircraft position lights were used to avoid revealing the new position. After landing the aircraft, a perimeter was established integrating the rocket ships into the overall defense plan by anticipating their use as an airborne counterattack element.

The aerial rocket artillery battalions demonstrated remarkable flexibility and usefulness in air assault operations. Habitually, ARA elements accompanied and supported each air assault of company size or larger, remaining airborne in the area until initial objectives were secured (aerial direct fire provides the most effective support for air assault). While the battalion could perform any of the artillery tactical missions, its most versatile role was that of general support, reinforcing direct support battalions with one or more batteries.