Book Review: Summons of the Trumpet

Probably one of the keenest felt frustrations of the combat troops in RVN was the granting by the US Administration of inviolate sanctuaries to the NVA and VC within the Countries of Laos and Cambodia and the strict enforcement of the de-militarised zone separating North and South Vietnam and forming the northern boundary of I Corps.

With the Ho Chi Minh trail running down through Laos and Cambodia, the forces of the NVA had almost complete freedom of movement without fear of interdiction by US ground troops. From base camps just inside the borders of these two countries they were able to stage attacks against US positions and retreat quickly back to their sanctuaries before overwhelming US fire-power could be brought to bear. In Northern I Corps, a flagrant disregard for the status of the demilitarised zone by the NVA provided almost uninterrupted routes of ingress and egress into that area of RVN whilst the USMC was tied into a static defensive posture.

Whilst the NVA and the VC massed their supplies and logistics and staged their forces just out of reach of the US forces, almost under their noses so to speak, the US Administration refused to allow the US Army and Marines to strike back. In effect they put their soldiers into an intolerable position.

Palmer’s book is an attempt to explain the background to the political machinations surrounding the war and gives an insight into the political battle of wills being waged in both Hanoi and Washington. Whereas the US soldier beat the enemy on the ground in almost all instances, the reverse is true in the political arena where Ho Chi Minh and his politicians ran the US ragged.

The US Commander-in-Chief, Lyndon Johnson, is shown to be a hesitant, naïve and indecisive war time leader, more concerned with US domestic opinion than with the security and safety of his Armed Forces serving in RVN. Johnson singularly failed to understand that to the Communists, the political arena was merely an extension of the war, waged by other means. Each time the NVA required some respite from the punishment meted out by US combat troops, they went to the negotiating table and each time they did so the heat was taken off when in fact it should have been applied more forcefully.

The US Administration, led primarily by McNamara, attempted to wage a war without possessing even the pretence of a strategy. They could not explain to either the US public or the US soldier why in fact the United States was even in RVN and, more importantly perhaps, what it’s strategy was going to be now that they were there.

Whilst US soldiers were being killed by an elusive enemy who could hit and run, the US soldier was hobbled by blinkered and naïve bureaucrats. McNamara thought of the war as some sort of problem which could be solved by statistical analysis whilst Johnson concerned himself with his re-election chances and how to extricate the US from what was becoming a debacle in SE Asia.

Neither man had the answer and had no idea how to find it. If they had simply stopped and listened to their Commander’s and troops on the ground, they would have found out in no time. The answer was quite simply, no sanctuary for the NVA and VC, anywhere, anytime. If that policy could not or would not be endorsed by the President then the US Army should have been withdrawn from RVN.

Palmer illustrates this point by reference to the results obtained in both the Cambodian and Laotian incursions and by the stepping up of the B-52 bombing campaigns against North Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh trail in Operation Linebacker. Each of these operations resulted in a significant reduction in the capability of the NVA and VC to conduct operations. Despite what many perceived as an escalation, few were able to accept that North Vietnam had no concern for the consequences of their actions to any of it’s SE Asian neighbours and would, whatever the cost, continue to wage the war whilst free to do so just outside of the reach of the US forces.

The point is made that if the US intended to stay and fight in RVN then it should have been allowed to do precisely that without being fettered by narrow considerations of policy and appeasement. If it was not prepared to unleash fully the power of the US Armed Forces then it should have got out considerably earlier than it did.

The book is an excellent introduction to the political machinations surrounding the War and affords the reader a much clearer insight into the almost farcical restrictions placed upon Westmoreland and his Command. It also provides an almost palpable feeling of frustration from the perspective of the Grunts who had to suffer because of this lack of political leadership.

Reviewed by Mike R