Book Review: The Rise and Fall of an American Army

The book chronicles the build up, deployment and eventual withdrawal of United States Ground Forces (both Army and Marine) over the years 1965 to 1973. The first five sections deal chronologically with the years 1965-1969 whilst the sixth and final section deals with the period 1970-1973. Within each section the author examines the overall strategic background for the period covered and the activities which took place throughout the various regions of the country. Regularly interspersed throughout the book are dramatic accounts of actual combat which give life to the bones of the narrative.

Stanton imparts to the reader a clear sense of the problems faced by the US in attempting to find, fix and destroy such elusive enemies as the NVA and Viet Cong. One feature of this is the constant redeployment of units around the various Tactical Zones in keeping with a new kind of warfare based on mobility and to an extent no longer limited by considerations of terrain or the historical boundaries of established front lines. Despite all their mobility however, one is left with the sense that the US underwent terrific amounts of activity which only occasionally resulted in large scale battles - on the whole it is small unit actions which exemplify the fighting - whilst the sense of frustration at not being able to bring large enemy formations to battle is almost palpable.

Whilst maintaining and exhibiting a healthy professional respect for the enemy it is clear that Stanton believes strongly in the overall combat superiority of the US forces and that were it not for their inviolable sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia the NVA and VC would have been comprehensively defeated. At the same time one is left with no doubt that the NVA and VC were expert at the type of war they were fighting. Throughout the book there exists a sense of inevitability about US casualties which is linked more to the political constraints put upon them by their own government than their inherent military competence. Stanton clearly believes that the unsatisfactory prosecution of the war by the US government; in particular it's failure to mobilise the reserve, it's programme of Vietnamization and it's failure to clearly define it's policy on Vietnam to the US public (for a detailed account of this see, Summons of the Trumpet), inevitably doomed it's military in the paddies and jungles of SE Asia.

Overall an extremely interesting book but which at times can appear heavy going. If you want to know where a particular unit was and what it was doing at a particular time then this is where you will find out. Similarly for an insight into the complexities of grand strategy then look no further. For the wargamer the lack of minutiae and detail can lead to frustration, but buried within the more scholarly stuff their are some real nuggets.

Reviewed by Mike R