Vietnam Studies: Riverine Operations, 1966-1969 £2.99

This monograph describes U.S. Army Riverine planning and operations in the Republic of Vietnam during the years 1966 through 1969. Since the personal experience of the author was with preparations for riverine operations and the initial operations themselves, emphasis has been placed on these activities through early 1968. In summarizing operations conducted in the balance of the three-year period, particular attention has been called to significant trends or changes in riverine operations in Vietnam, a co-operative enterprise of the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy.

During 1965 and 1966 when the possibility of creating a U.S. riverine force for operations in the Mekong Delta was being discussed, there were three basic considerations that weighed heavily in favor of the force: a tradition of past American success in riverine operations, particularly Union operations in the Mississippi basin during the Civil War; the success more recently achieved by the French in riverine operations during the Indochina War under conditions that appeared to have, changed little during the years that had intervened; and, most important, a situation in the Mekong Delta that seemed ripe for exploitation by a riverine force

Perhaps the most significant organizational aspect of the Mobile Afloat Force concept was the integration of Army and Navy units to provide a force uniquely tailored to the nature of the area of operations. Specifically, the capabilities of the two services were used to the fullest by combining tactical movement of maneuver and fire support units by land, air, and water. To this combination was added the close support of the U.S. Air Force. The Mobile Afloat Force plan stipulated that these mobile resources were not to be dissipated on independent U.S. operations but were to be used in close co-ordination with other U.S. and Free World Military Assistance Forces.

The joint river operations conducted by the U.S. Army and Navy in South Vietnam contributed to the success of the military campaign in the Mekong Delta and added substantially to U.S. knowledge of riverine operations.

Detailed Table of Contents:

I BACKGROUND

• Previous American Experience; French River Warfare in Indochina, 1945-1954; The Mekong Delta; Enemy Forces; Republic of Vietnam Forces; US Forces; The Situation in 1966.

II THE CONCEPT OF A RIVERINE FORCE

III RIVERINE PREPARATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN VIETNAM

• Review of the Mobile Afloat Force Concept; 9th Infantry Division Studies the Mobile Afloat Force; The Coronado Conference and Doctrine; Final Decisions on Deployment; 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Arrives in Vietnam; Rung Sat Special Zone Operational Training.

IV INITIAL DELTA OPERATIONS

• Movement to Dong Tam; Final Mobile Riverine Force Preparations; 2d Brigade Operations; Mobile Riverine Force Campaign Plan.

V PLANS AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES FOR THE MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE

• Intelligence; Planning; Operational Concept and Procedures.

VI III CORPS OPERATIONS AND THE THREAT TO DONG TAM

• Can Giuoc Operation; Go Cong Operation; Further Can Giuoc Operations; Dinh Tuong Operation; The Mobile Riverine Force Returns to Ill Corps; Ben Luc Operation.

VII CAM SON TO THE RACH RUONG CANAL

• Dinh Tuong Province and Coronado V; Coronado IX; Six Months in Retrospect.

VIII TET OFFENSIVE OF 1968 AND US REACTION

IX PACIFICATION AND KIEN HOA PROVINCE

• The Third Battalion;Operation SEA LORDS.

X CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY

GLOSSARY