Vietnam Studies: The War in the Northern Provinces 1966-1968

The North Vietnamese Army units deployed just north of the demilitarized zone in 1966 posed a serious and continuing threat to the security of Quang Tri and Thua Thien, the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. This is an account of the North Vietnamese attempts to seize control of these two provinces and of the response of the Free World Military Assistance Forces. The period covered by this narrative is from the spring of 1966 to the spring of 1968 and is the story, primarily, of U.S. Army units.

The North Vietnamese failed to achieve victory in the northern provinces in 1968 because their efforts to gain and retain control of the population and the government of South Vietnam were obstructed by determined U.S. and Free World Military Assistance Forces.

During the critical period when the enemy upgraded his operations from insurgency and guerrilla actions to a full-scale conventional invasion, enemy aims were thwarted by military action. The success of the Free World Forces can be attributed to their flexibility in organization and tactics to meet the ever changing enemy situation and their mutual co-operation in conducting combined operations against the foe.

The success was also due to the steady improvement of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces—a long-term goal of the headquarters of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The establishment of programs to win the allegiance of the people to their government by eliminating the social, political, and economic injustices which provided a fertile environment for insurgency also furthered success.

Detailed Table of Contents:

I. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS

Background; The Northern Border, 1965-1967; Continuing Activity Along the Demilitarized Zone.

II. PREPARING FOR A SHOWDOWN

The Anti-Infiltration System; Free World Forces; The Growth of Logistic Facilities; Upgrading of the Vietnamese Army Forces.

III. THE BLEAK PICTURE

Operation Niagara; The Battle of Khe Sanh - Opening Round; The Tet Offensive - First Phase; The Battle for Hue; Intelligence; Battle for Quang Tri; Enemy Attacks on the Logistical System; Task Force Clearwater.

IV. U.S. RESPONSE TO THE TET OFFENSIVE

Planning for the Relief of Khe Sanh; Single Manager for Air Concept.

V. KHE SANH AND PEGASUS

Planning for Pegasus; Operation Orders.

VI. THE FREE WORLD COUNTEROFFENSIVE

Opening Operations; Back to A Shau.

VII. ANALYSIS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE GOALS AND FAILURES

Intelligence; Organization for Combat; Airmobility; Superior Firepower; Communications; Logistics; Improvement of Vietnamese Armed Forces; The Other War; Conclusion.

GLOSSARY